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ABSTRACT 
The recent Wal-Mart/Massmart merger decision by the Competition Tribunal has highlighted the delicate 
role that the South African Competition Authorities (the Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal 
and the Competition Appeal Court) play between balancing public interest provisions and competition 
issues in merger decisions. As a result of South Africa’s numerous social and economic challenges, 
competition policy has been identified as a key instrument in economic development. This begets the 
question: does the Competition Act (Act 89 of 1998 as amended) empower the Competition Authorities 
with adequate tools to address economic policy challenges of South Africa? And if it does not, should the 
Competition Act be amended to provide for such tools and what should these amendments be if any?  
This paper identifies the public interest issues which arise through merger review, compares South 
Africa’s application to other jurisdictions and analyses the benefits and costs of including them in 
competition law. This paper proposes the way forward for the Competition Authorities in deciding on 
mergers which affect public interest with possible suggestions on amendments to the policy framework to 
ensure efficient and effective delivery of economic development outcomes for the people of South Africa. 
We argue that whilst there is definitely a role for public interest considerations in merger regulation, it 
must be balanced with competition related concerns and complemented with other policy amendments. 
 
Introduction 
The recent decisions made by the Competition Tribunal in relation to large mergers has 
highlighted the use of public interest provisions in South African competition law. The competition 
law in South Africa provides a means in which public interest (inter alia employment, the ability of 
small businesses to become competitive and the ability of industries to become competitive) can 
be addressed in merger regulation. The underlying paradox however, is that South African 












interests of both business and the public. This mandate can be contradictory in nature.  Whilst 
there is a causal relationship between competition and productivity (see Backus, 2011), there is a 
likelihood that a mergers competitive effects will have a negative impact on those variables 
deemed to be public interest issues (for example, in creating efficiencies in the market place, a 
merged entity may remove underperforming sectors of the business i.e. through cutting of labour 
etc.). This process may concern competition authorities in that through driving for X-inefficiency a 
merger may “step on” public interest issues. Similarly, whilst merger theory has centred on the 
preposition that a merger may give rise to these efficiencies, one of the most enduring puzzles in 
modern corporate finance is why many mergers appear to lower shareholder value (see Jensen 
and Ruback, 1983 and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001 for surveys of this literature). Two 
strands of literature have attempted to reconcile this: agency theory which attributes the negative 
post-merger stock performance to a principle-agent problem, and market timing theory which 
attributes it to an overdue correction of mispricing (Yan, 2006).  
Whilst, managerial decisions and those of its board are ideally centred on maximising 
shareholder value, the merger process may as with some large cases in South Africa, treaded on 
certain public interest issues. South Africa is unique in that public interest forms part of the legal 
process in the decision of a merger1 and this can ultimately lead to pro-competitive mergers being 
declined based on their negative effects on public interest, while similarly an anti-competitive 
merger can be approved as a result its public interest benefits.   
This begets the question as to whether the South African Authorities should be involved in public 
interest issues, or whether they should limit themselves to competition related matters? The 
question of whether state intervention in the market is advisable is up for considerable debate 
with two schools of thought emerging.  
The first school of thought is founded on the Chicago school of anti-trust which advocates 
minimal state intervention in regulating markets, as information to regulate is costly and difficult to 
obtain and political pressures can be exerted to distort competition laws. It also advocates that 
policies which open up economies to international competition alleviate many concerns of 
traditional competition policy (Cook, 2001). In South Africa, the Competition Act has provided for 
the creation of three independent bodies which regulate competition, namely the Competition 
Commission, the Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court (CAC). The government 
                                                          
1 The European Communities Merger Regulation does allow for member states to notify the European Competition Commission 
should any merger impede on legitimate public interest cases (see COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 
available online http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:024:0001:0022:EN:PDF). In the UK,  the 
Enterprise Act (2002) gives “power to make references” to the Secretary of State if he believes that public interest is relevant to a 













is allowed to make submissions to the Tribunal; however no Minister may override a decision 
made by the Tribunal or CAC. This removes the incentive for firms to lobby government to 
intervene in competition matters.  
The alternative to the above school is regarded as the Harvard school of thought and proponents 
of this school generally advocate for greater government regulation in light of the structural 
background in which countries have found themselves. Developing countries have predominately 
promoted state-owned enterprises to such an extent that markets have been representative of 
large monopolies with high government regulation restricting entry into the market. South Africa’s 
structure during apartheid was very similar: highly concentrated markets characterised by state 
supported enterprises dominated the market during the apartheid years. Theoretically this 
structure of the economy leads to conduct which incentivises firms to collude resulting in higher 
prices (Structure-conduct-performance or SCP paradigm). The argument for favouring increased 
regulation in these instances where SCP is apparent is that amalgamation of economic and 
competition regulation leads to less chance of firms capturing regulatory interest through industry 
lobbying and gives greater certainty to the public of the jurisdictional boundaries in which the 
policy rests.  
Secondly, if the answer is that they should, the question is whether they can deal with this 
complex and somewhat contradictory mandate of both promoting competition while protecting 
public interest? The recent merger activity has catapulted this discussion with the media, 
economists, lawyers and the public all voicing their opinion on the matter. 
This paper condenses these views on the backdrop of the economic and legal viewpoint. It 
provides the reader with an understanding of the implementation and interpretation of the 
Competition Act, as well as introducing the topic of public interest in the context of recent merger 
activity in South Africa which has sparked further discussion. The paper is structured as follows: 
the following section highlights the background of the South African competition legislation and 
continues by explaining the theoretical underpinning of growth through competition. We then 
outline the current policy and competition challenges that South Africa faces and compare them 
to other countries, mainly to those which share similarities in their purpose and structure such as 
the EU and US. We then discuss the legal framework behind competition policy with some 
comments on the role that public interests have and should play in the current legislation. We 












Background and history of South Africa’s competition legislation 
Competition law is one of the means by which states regulate the behaviour of players in free-
market economies (Sutherland & Kemp, 2010). Competition policy is rather difficult to define as it 
encompasses a broad range of objectives however Motta (2004) has defined it as “the set of 
policy and laws which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way 
as to reduce economic welfare.” Economic welfare is the predominant aspect which competition 
authorities attempt to pursue. However, alongside economic welfare there are a number of other 
aspects that are pursued, namely those of defending smaller firms, promoting market integration 
and fighting inflation (Motta, 2004).  
Generally competition laws were introduced in countries in an effort to counter monopoly power of 
large firms who were controlling important sectors of the economy such as transportation and 
communication. In the US for example, the economies of scale that firms in key sectors enjoyed 
and the resultant instability in prices from price wars, lead to the first such implementation of 
competition policy through the Sherman Act. The European Communities followed suit shortly 
thereafter implementing various competition policy measures in the 1951 Treaty of Paris due to 
Germany’s dominance in key supply inputs and the growing acceptance of free market as the 
only way in which to promote an efficient functioning market (Motta, 2004). 
The development of competition law in South Africa followed much of the US and EU 
developments. The US, in 1890 at the time of the passing of the Sherman Antitrust Act, was 
particularly concerned with the formation of anti-competitive trusts (such as the oil trusts) and as 
a result anti-trust law, or competition law as it is more commonly known, was developed. The US 
strengthened its enforcement of the Sherman anti-trust law by enacting the Clayton Act of 1914. 
The Clayton Act deals with price discrimination, exclusive dealings and mergers and acquisitions 
regulations. South Africa followed a similar path in that the newly elected government was 
concerned with monopolistic and anti-competitive behaviour as a result of apartheid policies and 
as such the Competition Act of 1998 was passed. Before the passing of the Competition Act, 
there was no broad legislative framework which promoted competition and South Africa was 
considered to be one of the least competitive of the trading nations  (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 1997).  
The arrival of the newly elected government, following the end of apartheid in 1994, ushered in a 
new era of competition policy. The extent of market power was a key issue of policy debate, with 
competition policy reflected in the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), 












The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) guidelines for the formation of a new Competition 
Act, proposed harmony between driving efficiency gains as a result of increased competition 
whilst emphasising that public interest issues such as socio-economic injustices were equally 
looked at (Department of Trade and Industry, 1997). The guidelines were intended such that 
competition policy “...is reconcilable with national policy objectives and instruments, and that the 
different policy sets re-enforce each other.” The DTI’s framework provides much of the rationale 
for having competition policy working alongside that of established policy objectives found in the 
RDP as well as those of the now-defunct GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) 
strategy.  
The arrival of the Competition Act heralded a new era of competition jurisprudence in South 
Africa. Mergers had to be notified before implementation and firms were given the option to blow 
the whistle on anti-competitive conduct through the corporate leniency policy. The result of this 
and other measures put in place by the Competition Act of 1998 has regulated much of the anti-
competitive nature inherent in the South African economy.   
The economics of competition and policy 
Before we address the debate, it is important to analyse the underlying economic theory. In a 
perfectly competitive market, one in which there are many buyers and sellers, and none of whom 
represent the large part of the market, firms are price takers. That means that sellers of a 
particular product have no strategic decisions to make as these decisions do not affect the overall 
level of price. Social welfare is maximised as firms are equating their marginal costs to price and 
when marginal cost is equal to price, firms are making no profit and the resultant effect is that 
welfare is maximised. 
When only a few firms produce a good, the impact is very different. In this market, a firm’s 
strategic behaviour can have drastic effect on the market price. If we took a real world example, 
such as Boeing and Airbus, Boeing knows that any change in its supply of commercial planes to 
the market will have an effect on the price. If it would like to drive down the price of planes, it 
would increase the supply of planes and vice versa.  In imperfect competition then, firms are 
aware that they can influence prices. It is characterised by industries with a few major producers, 
and consumers view products as strongly differentiated from those of a rival firm. Economists 
generally view firms in these markets as being price setters, rather than price takers.2 
                                                          












Generally the most common market structure is one of small-group oligopoly, where only a few 
firms are engaged in competition. Two kinds of behaviour arise in general oligopoly settings that 
are not captured by the model of imperfect competition. The first is collusive behaviour – either an 
understanding or explicit agreement between firms on costs, prices and market behaviour; and 
the other is strategic - generally captured by firms building up excess capacity in order to use it to 
deter potential rivals from entering the industry. Both are seen as having a negative impact on the 
welfare of consumers (Perkins, Radelet, & Lindauer, 2006).  
The economic theory underpinning competition is that competition drives three things (Motta, 
2004):  
i) Innovation between firms, as threat of a new entrant incentivises firms to focus on 
differentiating their product from a rival;  
 ii) Lower prices, as firms compete for profits through price; and lastly  
 ii) Efficient allocation of scarce resources.  
In 1776, when Adam Smith was writing his Wealth of Nations, the concept of competition was 
familiar, and was formulated in the context of independent rivalry between two or more persons 
(Cook, 2001). Competition, when viewed in this way would, in the long run, eliminate excessive 
profits and unsatisfied demands. This view has carried through to more mathematical analysis of 
its effect through Cournot and Bertrand. Cournot models emphasise that the strategic variables 
that firms choose are their output levels. Bertrand models emphasise that the strategic variable of 
firm’s is rather price which firms would use in order to supply the resulting demand for their 
products (Motta, 2004). Both models agree that competition delivers increased welfare to 
consumers who benefit in the form of lower prices and increased product choice.    
Where markets are unable to motivate producers to operate as efficiently as possible, and 
competition is stifled, economists regard these as market failures. As the case is in South Africa, 
and other developing countries, monopoly or oligopoly power (where one or few sellers gain 
control of the market) presents with it a challenge to regulatory authorities in how to design 
interventions which can overcome the misallocation of resources through market failure. Whilst 
market failure is due to allocation of goods or services by a free market being inefficient, 
imperfect competition is due to the conditions of a perfectly competitive market not being 
satisfied. Monopolies are generally considered to misallocate resources as they use their market 
power to restrict output below the quantity at which marginal social benefit is equal to marginal 












resources and stagnating growth in an economy. Market failures in low income countries are 
generally viewed as a result of weak institutions, inadequate infrastructure and segmented 
markets (Cook, 2001). 
There is no debate between market adherents and those who favour intervention over the 
existence of these market failures, but there is considerable debate over their relative importance 
and the right policy approaches to respond to these failures. It must be noted that markets do not 
spare thought for public interest considerations in determining efficiency gains. In this, firms who 
drive efficiency can do so by lowering costs or innovating, which results in lower prices to end 
consumers. These strategies could have potentially negative effects on so called public interest 
issues, whereby chasing efficiency gains could result in job losses or removal of inefficient 
domestic suppliers in favour of more efficient international suppliers. These and other effects on 
public interest issues generally help to lay claim for those advocating state intervention, as 
markets cannot correct for the past social injustices and make no room for inefficiencies borne 
out of inefficient labour practices. Therefore, there is a theoretical argument for state intervention 
but the size of, and what actions to take are still contestable.  
The policy challenges that South Africa faces 
South Africa faces a number of challenges with regards to unemployment and inequality. A 
number of policy documents have attempted to steer South Africa out of the inequality borne as a 
result of historic factors such as colonialism and apartheid policies and towards administrating 
inclusive and sustainable growth. The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP2) (which replaced the 
Growth Economic and Redistribution Policy (GEAR)) and the New Growth Path (NGP) are two 
cornerstone policy documents which highlight several policy plans that the South Africa 
government seeks to implement with competition policy in mind.  
In 2010 the IPAP2 succeeded the successful IPAP and is in line with the National Industrial Policy 
Framework (NIPF) which sets out government’s approach to industrialisation. It proposes a 
number of key objectives, such as diversifying the reliance on traditional commodities, promotion 
of more labour-absorbing services and goods and increasing participation of historically 
disadvantaged people. IPAP2 recognises that South Africa has been unsuccessful in raising its 
growth levels to that of its peers across medium and low-income countries and has a continual 
dependence on consumption-led sectors of the economy (DTI, 2010). This has led to large 
structural imbalances within the economy and this effect has been accentuated by the global 












and initial attempts of supporting manufacturing industries like the motor industry, have not 
reaped the rewards that they had promised (Flatters, 2005).  
South Africa’s relatively stable macro environment has also not yielded the required micro 
economic success. Employment is still sustained by the financial services sector and is 
determined to be unsustainable in the current economic climate (DTI, 2010). There is also a large 
skills shortage as many skilled people leave for other countries (Daniels, 2007). As such 
economic policy is geared towards its main aim of driving employment through a mixture of trade 
policy, labour policy and pertinently for our discussion competition policy.  
Competition policy is one of the few successes of the South African government. Its success can 
be attributed mainly to the transparency of the procedures, independence of the Competition 
Authorities and its success in investigating anti-competitive firms. The IPAP2 devotes a section to 
competition policy and emphasises the need to bring about lower competitive prices to those 
products which are predominately relied on by the poor. The IPAP2 also outlines three main 
objectives for competition policy. These goals are predominately aimed at fostering competition in 
strategic inputs required in the downstream industries, as well as fostering competition in goods 
purchased by the poor and also by increasing the cost-effectiveness of the public infrastructure 
programme (DTI, 2010). The IPAP2 considers the role of competition authorities as focused on 
these goals whilst “exercising both existing and recently established legislative powers (DTI, 
2010, p. 33).” 
The NGP aims at alleviating most of the structural imbalance in the economy by creating 
sustainable employment opportunities. It seeks to address amongst other things the “continued 
economic concentration in key sectors, permitting rent-seeking at the expense of consumers and 
industrial development” (2010, p. 5). It seeks to add on where the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme left off in terms of driving long-term development and growth. Its main 
aim is to create five million jobs by 2020 and has highlighted a number of labour absorbing 
sectors and key job drivers which can aid in this goal. The NGP has also boldly stated that it 
needs various policy packages aimed at both micro- and macro-economic sections of the 
economy in order for it to function properly.  
Competition policy forms part of both the IPAP2 and the NGP underlining the priority that both 
documents afford it in changing the economic landscape and correcting the structural imbalances 
within the economy. The IPAP2 recommends that competition policy has a role to play in 












goods’ and other products purchased by the poor and creating a cost-effective public 
infrastructure program (EDD, 2010).  
Similarly, the NGP outlines the role it foresees competition policy playing in reducing 
unemployment and increasing output and investment. The EDD has outlined a number of 
measures that competition policy should play and it is of particular interest to our discussion to 
highlight these. The NGP has stated that “[m]ore consideration should be given to mandating 
public interest conditions on proposed mergers, particularly in respect of employment and prices” 
and that “[c]ompetition authorities should involve trade unions more, as provided for in the 
Competition Act. Unions should develop their capacity to share information and insights on 
employment issues in mergers and acquisitions” (2010, p. 19). 
The combination of these proposals by government leads to the question: how far should 
competition policy and the authorities that implement it be pressurised to correct structural 
imbalances within the economy? And is the mandate of the Competition Authorities too broad or 
too narrow when dealing with market failures? And lastly, is the South African’s government’s 
prescription of what to investigate and what should be done in merger regulation advantageous to 
the economy? Before answering these questions it is important to understand the legal 
framework which provides the tool of implementing competition policy  
The legal framework on which competition policy rests 
South Africa’s Competition Act is a legal document which provides a tool to implement 
competition policy. It is comprised of two main chapters which regulate firms’ behaviour; Chapter 
2 deals with prohibited practices and Chapter 3 with merger control. The preamble of the 
Competition Act provides much of the industrial objectives set out in policy documents. The 
preamble specifically stipulates that: 
 The people of South Africa recognise: 
That apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices in the past resulted in 
excessive concentrations of ownership and control within the national economy, 
inadequate restraints against anticompetitive trade practices, and unjust 
restrictions on full and free participation in the economy by all South Africans.  
That the economy must be open to greater ownership by a greater number of 












That credible competition law, and effective structures to administer that law, are 
necessary for an efficient functioning economy.  
That an efficient, competitive economic environment, balancing the interests of 
the workers, owners and consumers and focussed on development, will benefit 
all South Africans. 
An elaboration of objectives and purposes of the Competition Act is specified within the preamble 
of the Competition Act as follows3: 
a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans; 
d) to expand the opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic; 
e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy; and  
f) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons
4
.  
These goals link up to economic goals as mentioned above. The NGP advocates providing 5 
million jobs by 2020. It also stipulates that employment be centred on driving employment 
opportunities for the previously disadvantaged, as well as focussing on micro enterprises. 
Public interest objectives in the Competition Act 
The public interests are incorporated within the Competition Act in Section 12A (3), and relate 
only to exemptions and merger regulation. The exemption provisions apply to any firm who 
engages in an agreement or practice which would ordinarily be restricted by the Competition Act. 
Such a practice would be a restrictive horizontal or vertical practice or an abuse of dominance. 
The Competition Act allows for exemption of such practices if it contributes to any of the 
                                                          
3 Section 2 of the Competition Act  












objectives outlined in the Competition Act5. These objectives are: maintenance or promotion of 
exports; promotion of the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons to become competitive; change in productive capacity necessary to stop 
decline in an industry; or the economic stability of an industry designated by the Minister, after 
consultation with the Minister responsible for that industry. Notable exemptions that the 
Competition Commission has received include code-sharing agreements between SAA and 
Qantas airline.6  
The second area of South African Competition law in which public interests feature prominently is 
in merger regulation and the topic of discussion for our paper. For the purpose of the Act, a 
merger occurs when one or more firms establish direct or indirect control over the whole or part of 
the business of another firm7. Those mergers which breach a predetermined threshold, as 
determined by the Competition Authorities, need to be notified. Mergers can be classified as 
small, intermediate or large depending on thresholds determined by the Competition 
Commission. 
When assessing a merger, the Competition Commission or Competition Tribunal must determine 
whether the merger will likely to have an effect on a specific industrial sector or region, 
employment, the ability of small businesses to become competitive or on the ability of historically 
disadvantaged persons to be competitive. These are termed the “public interest grounds” around 
which much debate is centred. Public interests grounds must be considered regardless of the 
competitive effects of the merger. Theoretically, as mentioned this means that a pro-competitive 
merger can be declined if there are sufficient public interest grounds that are negatively affected. 
Similarly, an anti-competitive merger can be approved if there appears to be a positive effect on 
public interest as a result of the merger.  
Of the public interest grounds, employment has received the most attention. Before approving 
any merger, the Competition Authorities must consider any input from affected employee groups 
or trade unions. The Competition Act requires that trade unions and / or employee groups 
affected by the merger must be notified. This is achieved through the parties to the transaction 
serving to such trade unions or employees the notification of the merger before serving it to the 
                                                          
5 Section 10 of the Competition Act 
6 Government Gazette, Notice 461 of 2009. SAA applied for an exemption from section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Competition Act 1998 in 
respect of a commercial and code sharing agreement with Qantas in respect of the South Africa-Australia route.  This was, in fact, 
an application exemption for an agreement that was previously approved until 30 June 2002. The grounds for the 
exemption application were that the agreements are required to attain two objectives namely for the maintenance or promotion of 
exports, and in respect of a change in productive capacity to stop decline in an industry (sections 10(3)(b)(i) and (ii) of the 
Competition Act 1998).  Based on the information made available to it the Commission was of the opinion that both the code share 
agreement and the commercial agreement  were required to contribute to the objectives set forth in section 10(3)(b)(i) and (iii).   












Competition Authorities. A merger cannot be registered with the Commission if no service has 
been affected on trade unions or employees where applicable (Chetty, 2005).  
As a result, the legal framework under which the Competition Authorities are mandated to act is 
geared towards assisting in the policy objectives decided by government. Employment receives 
widespread attention in the IPAP2 and the NGP and therefore has received much attention in 
Competition Authorities’ view on mergers. There are numerous benefits to having an integrated 
law and policy approach to deal with the problems that South Africa faces.  
Benefits of public interest provisions in competition law 
Mainly, merger regulation (as defined in the Competition Act) is used as a filter for those 
transactions which are deemed to have a negative effect on public interest issues (with 
employment being one). It also provides trade unions the right to submit their concerns with 
regards to a transaction and its effect on employment. Although South Africa is unique in that 
public interest plays a vital role in merger proceedings, other jurisdictions are increasingly aware 
of including public interest provisions in decisions relating to competition. Complex monopoly 
provisions in the UK outline that the Competition Commission (which replaced the MMC) when 
investigating reports of monopoly situation, must report on whether it operates against the public 
interest (Hay, 1997). Similarly, the US and the EU, following the economic crisis saved troubled 
firms by permitting mergers that were anti-competitive in the defence of public interest. 
Employment is receiving widespread attention and competition policy in South Africa is 
considered an effective means of addressing it. 
Notwithstanding the context of South Africa, this paper has mentioned the policy documents 
which are cornerstone to South Africa’s economic recovery namely the IPAP2 and the NGP. 
Underlying these documents is the need for driving of employment and protecting those workers 
whom already are employed. A competition policy which is void of this would not be “reconcilable 
with national objectives and instrument” as mentioned in the DTI’s framework for competition 
policy. The benefits of creating a common goal for national and competition policy are numerous 
yet principally they aid government’s objectives by focussing several governmental entities into 
one policy approach.  
Thirdly, the benefit of having the Competition Authorities facilitate debate on this issue is that they 
are an independent and transparent means of ensuring that all parties get their fair say. Provided 
that the government does not interfere with the proceedings the decision reached by the 












inclusion of all parties affected. However, independence is not the only cornerstone to success – 
transparency is too. Generally, the authorities in South Africa are widely respected for their 
transparency in application of merger regulation. 
Including public interests also serves another function, mainly that of indirectly affecting firm’s 
decision and management processes. Although no data can be gathered on firm’s strategies, it 
can be safely assumed that including public interest in competition law forces firms engaged (or 
potentially engaged) in mergers to address the public interest considerations of their proposed 
transaction. From a game theoretic point of view, the success of a merger that would affect public 
interests would be higher if firms addressed these concerns in their submission to the 
Competition Authorities. This raises the awareness of firms responsibilities in terms of the 
Competition Act and the public interest enshrined therein and improves dialogue between the 
merging parties and labour unions. 
Lastly, the South African Competition Authorities have on several occasions attached conditions 
on to mergers that may have the effect on public interest issues. For example, In the 
Metropolitan/Momentum merger8 the Competition Tribunal imposed a condition that a moratorium 
on all merger related retrenchments exist for a period of two years (excluding senior employees). 
The decision to impose conditions was seen as a more effective way of mitigating the public 
interest issues (namely that of employment concerns) than outright refusal of the merger.9 
Costs of including public interest in competition law 
Whilst there are numerous benefits mentioned above, including public interest provisions can be 
costly. We highlight some of these costs below: 
The first cost of including public interest in competition law is that there is a distinct trade-off 
between long run efficiency and short-run benefits. We imply by this, that public interests are 
predominately a short run effect and correcting mergers for their effect on employment in the 
short run is traded off for the potential positive benefits that a merger may have in terms of driving 
efficiencies in the long run. This trade-off is difficult to quantify as mergers may have long-run 
efficiencies but when and for how long is normally uncertain, whereas the short run benefits of 
protecting and promoting public interests are often quantifiable and are observable to the media, 
public and politicians. This trade-off is a cause for concern for including public interest in 
competition law as long-run efficiencies borne out of a merger may indeed surpass those 
                                                          
8 Competition Tribunal of South Africa, Metropolitan Holdings Limited and Momentum Group Limited, Case no: 41/LM/Jul10, 
October 2010. 












negative effects which may occur in the short run – increased competition may bring about lower 
mark-ups and with it lower prices to consumers. However, how to measure the long run benefits 
as opposed to the short-run costs are indeed very difficult to do and governments can be forgiven 
for choosing to focus their attention on attaining short run benefits which are observable to their 
constituents. 
An additional cost is that firms may be operating at a less efficient level then what they could be 
as a result of a stringent merger regulation. This drives up average total cost and could result in 
firms operating at higher levels of their marginal revenue curves. This in turn drives up price and 
such a situation is similar to a monopolist pricing. This bears with it inefficiencies in lowering 
demand and raising prices.  
So how does South Africa compare with other jurisdictions in terms of regulating public interest 
that arises from mergers? Internationally public interest considerations are not included in 
competition law, yet there is a growing trend of competition authorities (especially that of the 
European Commission) to include a brief overview of the public interest effects on a proposed 
transaction in competition decisions. Public interest however, does play a more pertinent role in 
regulation of foreign direct investment. Canada, the United States and Australia all have various 
guidelines which regulate foreign direct investment. Canada for instance reviews investments into 
the country and proposes to encourage investment which “contributes to economic growth and 
employment opportunities”
10
. Any foreign direct investment above a certain threshold and triggers 
a review which must pass a “net benefit test.” The investment is reviewed by the particular 
Minister and is approved based on passing the net benefit test (Holden, 2007). It is interesting to 
note that more than 1600 applications have been approved with only two being declined (Morphet 
& Konstant, 2011).  
In Australia the process is similar in that reviews of an investment are triggered automatically 
should they pass a threshold. The review process is intended to ensure that any foreign 
investment is in the national interest. Unlike Canada, Australia first defines what would be 
contrary to the national interest and then the onus is placed on the Australian government to find 
reasons to reject a proposal (Holden, 2007). These provisions are considered a “negative test.” 
The Foreign Investment Review Board under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act of 1975 
carry out reviews of this nature (2007, p. 6). The United States remains completely liberal of 
foreign direct investment however; the United States President may block foreign acquisition if it 
is believed to threaten national security (2007, p. 9 ). Most industrialised countries including 
                                                          












Germany and Norway have some form of foreign acquisition review system in place (Jacobs & 
Coolidge, 2006, p. 2).  
Generally it is within countries rights to regulate their markets; however the key difference is that 
South Africa bestows this responsibility on its Competition Authorities rather than on Foreign 
Investment Review Board (as in Australia) or a Minister (as in Canada). Morphet and Konstant 
(2011) propose two key benefits of this framework namely that the merger process is ultimately a 
very public one which ensures that all views are aired, allowing for timely discussion from all 
interested and that the body who is contemplating the public interest levels are also analysing the 
competition effects. This is beneficial in that an overall impression of the competition related 
issues are used to inform their decision on the public interest issues that may arise in a merger. 
Although this paper is not intended to analyse which framework is best, it must be said that this 
combination has worked well over the last decade of the South Africa Competition Authorities. 
However, it must be said that this does raise the administrative burden on the Competition 
Authorities especially when assessing a large scale, highly publicised merger such as the Wal-
Mart/Massmart merger. Costs for Wal-Mart to run proceedings cost almost R400 million for the 
merging parties and consisted of a review of the transaction for several months by the 
Competition Authorities. This presents a significant burden of time and energy on a regulatory 
authority.  
There are further arguments that although regulation is somewhat necessary to regulate business 
interests, government has to understand that overstepping its mandate can have potentially 
disastrous effects on business confidence. If it appears that government, through the Competition 
Authorities are pushing their own mandate, it can possibly scare away potential foreign direct 
investment which could be debilitating for efforts to address those public interest issues it so 
strongly advocates.  
The last cost of including public interest issues are that companies seeking to invest in South 
Africa are buoyed by a level of certainty and predictability apparent in foreign markets. The 
inclusion of a wider scope for the Competition Authorities to judge on public interest issues does 
lead to difficulties in interpretation and the real possibility that decisions and rules they enforce 
may unintentionally conflict with one another (Morphet & Konstant, 2011). This bodes with it a 
level of uncertainty for investors and provides difficulty for the Competition Authorities to weigh up 
competition benefits with the potential negative effects on public interest. For example, what level 
of competitive benefit would one would require to justify 100 job losses in one industry? How 
would this be compared to an industry where 1000 jobs are lost in relation to a merger? 












Authorities are mandated with providing consistent and rational decisions in determining their 
decisions. A delicate balancing act is thus always in play and the Competition Authorities are in 
no doubt being accused on both sides of having failed to achieve the correct balance.  
We now look at the three mergers which have highlighted this delicate balancing act. 
Wal-Mart/Massmart merger 
The recent decision by the Competition Tribunal, which is currently under appeal, on the Wal-
Mart/Massmart merger has lead to several questions being asked of the Competition Authorities 
and their application of the public interest provisions apparent in section 12A(3)  of the 
Competition Act. The merger application was brought forward to the attention of the Competition 
Authorities when shareholders of Massmart voted in favour of the proposed merger on 18 
January 2011. The Competition Tribunal then approved the merger subject to conditions11 on 
June 2011. The trade unions, lead by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
has launched an appeal to the decision and it is currently under review at the Competition 
Appeals Court.  
This deal has to some extent highlighted the opposing views on the role of public interest in 
competition law. On the one hand, the proponents to the deal advocated that little to no public 
interest effect would be apparent as the acquisition of an existing South African company with its 
capital outlay would require only several “tweaks” to make it run more efficiently. It was common 
cause throughout the case that competition was not a concern to the Authorities, however, due to 
significant public concern the case was predominately argued on its public interest issues. 
The main argument brought forward by the trade unions consisted of three main spheres which 
we have condensed. Firstly, retrenchments were made before the merger by Massmart, which 
according to the unions, was done so in order to entice Wal-Mart into a deal to merge and this 
trend was likely to follow should the merger be approved. Secondly, the merger would, according 
with Wal-Mart’s anti-union policy, remove the right of employees to form trade unions. Lastly, the 
issue of local procurement and the effect that Wal-Mart’s global procurement policy would have 
on local suppliers already consigned to Massmart was raised.  
The arguments that the council for Wal-Mart put forward to each of these concerns was that –  
i) the retrenchments before the merger were as a result of Massmart combining two stores 
into one larger store which serviced the same area. Following the merger the net effect 
would be a gain on employment, not as the trade unions were implying a net loss. The 
                                                          












Tribunal tended to agree with the merging parties on this point, however, noticing that 
employment opportunities would arise in the future attached to its decision that the 503 
previously retrenched workers would be given first priority to any employment 
opportunities that arose as a result of the merger. It also attached to its condition a 
moratorium on merger related retrenchments for a period of two years. 
ii) Although Wal-Mart’s general policy was an outright refusal to engage with trade unions, it 
had in unionised markets where it operated, accepted unions were a part of doing 
business in that country. It also maintained that in the UK, where it operated, there was “a 
healthy relationship with unions.”
12
  The Tribunal in consideration of the trade unions 
argument attached to their approval the condition that trade unions be recognised for 3 
years by the merged entity. 
iii) Lastly, on local procurement, the merged entity argued that its effect on local 
procurement would be minimal as a result of the high costs involved and that any 
attempts at limiting the procurement to local suppliers would violate international trade 
law. The Tribunal agreed with this, however, imposed conditions that Wal-Mart provides 
for a fund that empowered small business and suppliers. 
The merger brought with it an interesting self reflection from the Tribunal who in their decision 
remarked that “[our] job in merger control is not to make the world a better place, only to prevent 
it becoming worse as a result of a transaction. This narrow construction of our jurisdiction has not 
always been appreciated by some of the intervenors who have sought remedies whose ambition 
lies beyond our purpose. It is not our task to determine whether those ambitions are legitimate 
public policy goals; only whether they lie within our powers.” 
The Tribunal has been bombarded with concerns voiced by Ministers and Trade Unions on the 
costs that approving such a transaction would have on the economy. At the forefront of this 
argument, is the costs to local producers whom it is alleged will be sidelined for imported and 
cheaper goods. Such an argument however, is purely unsupported and indeed speculative. A 
more competitive retail sector, which a merger of this magnitude is sure to promote, can only 
provide consumer with cheaper goods and especially as the IPAP2 puts it foster “competition in 
goods purchased by the poor.” Similarly, the retail sector is concentrated with the retail giants 
Shoprite Holdings, Pick ’n Pay and Spar having a commanding 60% market share of the retail 
industry. Such a merger can only promote and facilitate competition and improve consumer 
welfare. It is interesting to note that Wal-Mart expressed concern as to the regulatory burden that 
it encountered in filing for such a merger in South Africa and argued that this did not bode well for 
future FDI in the country (PMG, 2011). 
                                                          














 The Kansai/Freeworld merger (decided in 2011)13 was another merger where public interest 
effects were up to considerable debate. The merger was slightly different in application for the 
Competition Tribunal to that of the Wal-Mart case in which Kansai Paints Company Limited 
(“Kansai”) prepared a hostile takeover of Freeworld Coatings Limited (“Freeworld”). Kansai is a 
Japanese paint manufacturing company and is involved in the Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(“OEM”) automotive coatings industry, which it delivers through an independent distributor to 
Toyota. The transaction gave rise to possible horizontal overlap in activities as Freeworld, 
through DuPont, is also active in the manufacturing of automotive OEM coatings and is supplies 
all OMEs in South Africa.  
The merger raised some possible competition problems but of relevance several public interest 
concerns were raised as well to the Tribunal. The DTI intervened in the merger based on its 
concern that the merger would result in an increase in concentration as well as representing a 
direct threat to a government-supported localisation drive. The DTI proposed that due to the 
merger Kansai was unlikely to utilise the manufacturing facilities of DuPont and as a result may 
lead to an underinvestment in R&D in South Africa’s only manufacturing automotive OEM 
coatings.  
As a result the Commission attached to its decision that there would be no retrenchments for a 
period of three years, that Freeworld would continue manufacturing all proprietary coatings for a 
period of ten years, that there would an establishment of an automotive coatings and 
manufacturing facility in South Africa within five years, and that the merged parties invest in SA 
research and development in decorative coatings and implement a BEE transaction in two years 
(Competition Commission, 2011).  
These conditions are inherently to protect a state supported sector and invariably tread on the 
feet of business practice of the merging party. It also purveys to international investors that the 
DTI are inward looking and promote a very protectionist stance towards investment especially 
that of a sensitive industry. Although the arguments that the DTI brought forward were valid, the 
economic principle behind bringing in new entrants would not necessarily lead to an 
underinvestment in local firms but rather a more competitive environment in which to work under. 
The weighing up of local interests with that of international investment is surely a difficult one that 
the Competition Authorities are tasked with. This merger, alongside that of Wal-Mart, is 
unfortunately endangering South Africa as being labelled a difficult place to invest in.  
                                                          













The Metropolitan/Momentum merger (2010) involved two local financial firms in a large merger, 
that of Metropolitan Holdings Limited and Momentum Group Limited14. The merger involved no 
competitive concerns yet raised considerable employment losses, in the region of 1000 estimated 
job losses as a result of the transaction. The Tribunal held that the merger may be approved 
however subject to conditions that a moratorium be placed on merger related job losses for a 
period of two years.  
The case was a litmus test for the Tribunal in its application of the public interest issues under 
which it was mandated. The merger presented with it no competition related problems with the 
only concern being the effect that the merger would have on employment. In its decision, the 
Tribunal identified the following in its decision process: 
i) that a rational process had been followed in determination of the number of jobs lost i.e. 
that the reasons for the job reduction and number of jobs proposed to be shed be 
rationally connected; and 
ii) that the public interest in preventing employment loss is balanced by an equally weighty, 
but countervailing public interest justifying the job loss and which is cognisable under the 
Competition Act. 
The Tribunal found that there was no connection between the number of job losses to be shed 
(estimated at 1000) and an argument for a potential public interest gains proposed by the merger. 
The decision to shed a “substantial” amount of jobs was found during the merger process to be 
arrived at through an arbitrary manner and was not done in order to promote increased cost 
savings to the consumers but rather to maximise shareholder value (Competition Tribunal, 2010).  
The case raised significant concerns as there was no doubt that public interests issues were 
affected; no clarification was given on what the Tribunal viewed as “substantial.” There is no clear 
indication either in the Competition Act or competition policy as to what substantial public 
interests are and this gives way to confusion and inconsistencies in application of the Competition 
Act. Clarification on threshold bands would perhaps give companies greater indication of what the 
Tribunal views as a substantial loss of jobs.  
It also begs the question of who the Tribunal views as “public,” as in this case the public 
consisting of Momentum shareholders were certainly going to be better off at the expense of the 
employees, however, is this not driving efficiency in a predominately capitalistic system which is 
in place in South Africa? Or do the implications of workers and workers rights exceed those of 
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shareholders and companies rights? Or as George Orwell (1945) eloquently puts it: “[a]ll animals 
are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.” Of course, this rudimentary comparison 
does not suggest that in the context of South Africa, shareholders should be given free reign at 
the expense of their employees, but rather it highlights the difficulty in using a cost/benefit 
approach to public interest issues. This question as to who the Tribunal would view the public is 
general and not specifically related to this merger.  
This decision has highlighted that the Competition Authorities also somewhat overstepped their 
boundaries and acted on protecting jobs (something which the Labour Relations Act aims at 
addressing) by imposing a condition that no jobs would be lost for 2 years. This just extends a 
somewhat foregone conclusion that, should the merged entity wish to, jobs will be cut in some 
manner or form after the moratorium ends. In this decision the Competition Authorities did not 
according to its mandate aimed at promoting efficiency of the economy, or providing consumers 
with competitive prices and promoting employment. For the 2 year period, it has though, 
advanced the social and economic welfare of a select few employees of the merged entity. Yet, at 
what cost, it is still to be determined. 
Are Competition Authorities adequately empowered to deal with 
development challenges? 
As this paper has mentioned and the cases above have highlighted, public policy governs much 
of the rationale for decisions in competition policy. As the Competition Act falls under competition 
policy, it has been tasked with striking the correct balance between legal prescription and 
precedent with that of economic policy. South Africa faces rather large and daunting 
developmental challenges, in driving down the inequality between high income and low income 
parts of the population. 
The paper has highlighted how this can be somewhat a contradictory mandate. It is interesting to 
note how explicit consideration of public interest grounds has influenced the thinking of the 
Competition Authorities.  However, it has to be noted that the Competition Authorities have not 
been arbitrary in their application of the provisions of the Competition Act related to public 
interest. The balancing of public interest with competition concerns has been very carefully 
considered in all cases that have come before the Tribunal when these have issues have been 
raised15. 
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Unfortunately there is relatively little data on the effect the Competition Authorities have had on 
employment and its policy mandate of promoting employment. Employment levels are reflective 
of a number of variables (such as macroeconomic stability and the like) and not just of 
competition, so relying on some relationship between employment and competition within the 
market can lead to unreliable and inconclusive results. However, it can still be argued that South 
Africa has achieved a very delicate balance between incorporating public interest considerations 
and promoting competition in merger regulation. The Competition Authorities still take the 
approach of looking at the competitive effects of a merger first, and treat the public interest test as 
a filter which is given secondary consideration (Chetty, 2005). An example of this is that 
generally, public interest considerations are attached as conditions to mergers rather than 
determined what the result of a merger will be.16  
If Competition Policy is the tool with which government should be using to regulate industries 
dealing not only with competition issues but also public interest issues then the key issue is  
whether this tool needs to be strengthened. Research has shown that in the last decade of the 
Competition Authorities, South Africa has a highly concentrated economy, with Roberts (2004) 
estimating that the largest four firms in South Africa account for more than half of industry output 
in 46 percent of the 5 main product groupings in the country. The greater concentration of South 
Africa’s manufacturing industries is also associated with higher mark ups (Fedderke, Kularatne, & 
Mariotti, 2007).  
Despite this, there has been much gain in reducing industry concentration over the last decade. 
Reports have shown that increase in competition has attributed to higher total factor productivity 
growth (Aghion, Braun, & Fedderke, 2007) with an intended spinoff of increasing productivity 
growth and allocative efficiency (Mengistae, Daniels, Kaplan, Love, & Shah, 2010). It is not 
however, competition policy in isolation that has lead to these developments. Improvements in 
trade liberalization policies have also increased levels of competition in the market which has 
resulted in allocative efficiency gains similar to other developing countries.  
Regardless, the Competition Authorities have had a number of high profile success stories. 
These have catapulted the role that competition policy can play in regulating firms’ behaviour into 
the spotlight. The recent judgement ruling against cartel behaviour in the bread cartel, as well as 
judgements against large corporations such as Tiger Brands, SASOL and Arcelor-Mittal have  
increased demands being placed on the Competition Authorities, in light of the current financial 
crisis, to be more proactive in their approach to implementing competition reforms. Lewis (2009) 
                                                          












identifies three main areas of demand which can often take contradictory forms one of which is 
the increased demand of the regulator to giving more weight in the imposition of public interest 
mandates especially to those sectors within the economy that are considered vital17.  
Already, we have seen all of the above being demanded from the Competition Authorities. 
Powerful producer and labour unions have called on the Tribunal to give considerable thought to 
mergers which result in adverse effects on public interest. The transferring of the Competition 
Commission and Tribunal’s policy oversight to the EDD has brought with it an increased focus on 
public interest concerns. The Minister of Economic Development has called for a greater need for 
activist Competition Authorities and for public interest grounds to be of greater importance in 
merger review (Holland, 2010).  
Several institutions and academics (Mengistae, Daniels, Kaplan, Love, & Shah, 2010; EDD, 
2010; OECD, 2003; Hausmann, 2007) have called on amendments to be more activist in their 
nature and move away from a predominately “complaints driven process” to a more activist organ 
of state. We will now discuss the current amendments which seek to promote a more activist 
Competition Authority and discuss their validity. 
Current amendments which seek to strengthen competition policy 
The current amendments that have been drafted and are awaiting implementation in South Africa 
propose a more vigorous approach to competition through robust enforcement. Specifically the 
Competition Amendment Act of 2001 allows the Competition Authorities a means of investigating 
markets through a “market inquiry.”
 18 This allows the Competition Commission, acting on its own 
initiative or response from the Minister, to conduct market inquiries at any time if it has reason to 
believe that the market is preventing, distorting or restricting competition.  
The introduction of a complex monopolies provision seeks to complement the enforcement tools 
in concentrated markets where companies without market power adopt parallel behaviour to the 
detriment of competition. It seeks to empower authorities with far-reaching power to impose 
industry-wide structural or behavioural remedies beyond those available in the traditional tool-
box.  
The inclusion of complex monopolies provision follows much of the UK’s attempts at reducing 
anti-competitive behaviour. The complex monopolies provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1973 
have been used flexibly, an element which the UK Government has praised, to perform three 
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functions. The first is to investigate the anti-competitive conduct of professional trade 
associations. The second is to investigate market structures, which are linked to vertical 
agreements that have significant foreclosure effects; and lastly, to investigate oligopolies in beer 
and carbonated soft drinks market (Brent, 1993).  
The proposed amendments to the Competition Act also include mandatory prison sentences for 
those directors or persons in management authority of a firm who cause the firm to engage in 
prohibited practices. It allows for the overlapping of mandates for the National Prosecution 
Authority and the Competition Authorities. Including criminal liability for persons who break 
competition law is in line with international precedent whereby Australian and UK government 
have used it successfully to coerce directors to cooperate with investigations rather than run the 
risk of imprisonment (Marks, 2011).  
There is concern that South Africa’s judicial system is under severe pressure and adding an 
economic criminal prosecution will add to its inefficiency. It also will require more work from both 
the Competition Authorities and the criminal judicial system in order to prosecute directors who 
contradict the Competition Act. The overlapping of activities that the NPA and Competition 
Authorities are perceived to play will require prosecutors who are well trained in the area of 
economics and competition law, which presents some major challenges for an economy lacking 
in high level skills already.  
Regardless of the challenges that these amendments bring, there can be no debate as to the 
importance that competition policy is receiving in terms of its role in advocating change in 
inherent market structures. There is considerable debate over what role the state should play in 
regulating predominately market related aspects. The challenges South Africa faces are not 
isolated in their application. The structural and underdeveloped competition frameworks are 
apparent in other developing countries and it is desirable that states should do all they can to 
promote conditions for pro-competitive behaviour (Cook, 2001). Donor organisations recognise 
the role that competition can play its success in constraining large corporations. Developing and 
developed countries are pushing for a wider appreciation of competition policy in alleviating 
market failures and protecting public interest with notable success in developing countries.19 
 Should Competition Authorities be mandated to include more public interest provisions? 
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The paper has analysed whether Competition Authorities can deal with the public interest 
provisions in South African competition law, however there is also a normative question of 
whether they should.  
So how far should Competition Authorities go in regulating firms? If one advocates extensive 
regulation it can deter the promotion of competition; however if firms are not regulated, extensive 
market failures can exist. There is no definitive answer. It is a delicate balance that the 
Competition Authorities and likewise government must achieve. Increased state intervention in 
mergers can lead to business sentiment dropping and depending on the transaction can cause 
lengthy delays as Ministers, trade unions and interested parties submit their recommendations to 
the Authorities. This level of state intervention can lead to businesses reconfiguring their 
strategies towards mergers and causing foreign firms to think twice before implementing merger 
proceedings in South Africa, for example in the recent Massmart/Wal-Mart case transaction costs 
rose to just over R400m20 (The Citizen, 2011). Business is also hesitant of state intervention as 
many perceive that government has a lack of knowledge on the sector that it intends on 
correcting. The imposition of public interest considerations are seen by the business fraternity as 
too rigid and far-reaching and potentially open to abuse which has hindered market 
participation21. 
Competition policy is not the only means to deal with a structurally imbalanced economy. Other 
policy reforms can be considered when dealing with the structural imbalances of the economy. 
Strengthening of competition, can be done inter alia, by promoting new entrants to the market 
through decreasing the regulatory barriers necessary to enter the market. Government has also 
recognised the need for entrepreneurship in creation of new jobs and opportunities (Gordhan, 
2011; EDD, 2010). Coupled with this is the competition that international firms bring to a market. 
The arrival of large multinationals can bring with it increased product choice, decreased 
consumer prices and entrenched firms are encouraged to seek cost effective solutions to deal 
with new entrants. The recent Wal-Mart and Kansai merger decisions were critically analysed for 
their extensive application of the Competition Act in using it as an instrument to drive economic 
policies which were considered protectionist and antagonistic to foreign direct investment.  
Competition in the labour market and increasing productivity is an area where much government 
intervention is required in order to facilitate international competitiveness of firms. The tools 
provided for Competition Authorities, are inadequate to deal with labour relations and productivity 
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levels of workers, and rightly so. Competition Authorities should remain concentrated on 
improving competition within the market, whilst protecting those public interests which it serves. It 
is only through an integrated policy approach that South Africa can rid most of the structural 
imbalance prevalent in the economy.  
Proposed amendments to current legislation 
As a result there are a number of key areas with which government should focus their attention. It 
is crucial that government sees promotion of market related outcomes as vital to ensuring 
employment and poverty alleviation. This can be done through concentrating their efforts on 
promoting small businesses, encouraging foreign direct investment and allowing market forces to 
provide for employment opportunities. Linking with this is that the South African government must 
continue its approach to preserving the credibility of competition policy, through advocating the 
independence of the Competition Authorities.  
In addition a drive towards reforming state owned enterprises (SOEs) especially the energy, 
transport and telecommunications sectors can have considerable effect on the country’s growth 
and redistributive strategies. Greater emphasis must be placed on these institutions as they pose 
a clear threat on economic growth as a result of their market dominance (Lewis D. , 2008).  
Ggovernment can do more to increase c mpetition in overly concentrated sectors, such as the 
telecommunications sector. Increasing competition in this sector can give rise to large positive 
externalities. The direct benefits of a competitive telecommunications sector are evident in 
literature. Sappington and Ai (2001) found that competition accentuates the positive effect on 
network modernization investments. The IT industry can benefit considerably from increased 
competitiveness and this has positive spinoffs to the economy in the form of labour productivity, 
Research and Development and improvement of information flow (Lehr & Glassman, 2001) 
The government must also realise that application of the Competition Act is done by the courts 
who do not read economic policy into the Competition Act. This is a crucial understanding as to 
why the CAC overturned the decision by the Competition Tribunal on the Nationwide Poles/Sasol 
decision. This decision was overturned partly as the Tribunal read into the Competition Act the 
need to protect small businesses from larger corporations. However, public interest issues are 
prescribed only for merger regulation and do not branch into the rest of the Competition Act. If 
government wants economic policy to play a greater part in the Competition Act than it should 
amend the Competition Act to explicitly state it, rather than rely on the understanding of the 












from government, lawyers are trained in extracting the Competition Act’s meaning through 
precedent, its wording and application.  
If government would like changes to more adequately address the concerns apparent in the IPAP 
and NGP, there should be a dedicated push towards engineering a new Act which possesses the 
requirement to address these issues more directly. However, as this paper has mentioned, 
including public interest interests within the Competition Act can sometimes derail the exact 
effects government would like to address, namely those of increasing foreign direct investment 
and promoting competition.  
The government can also work towards increasing total factor productivity (“TFP”) through trade 
liberalization and competition policy reforms, which brings with it extensive benefits to the 
economy. The reforms of competition policy and trade policy have allowed for greater domestic 
product market competition which has improved the allocative efficiency of the domestic industry. 
Promoting a more activist competition policy can bring about further productivity gains as 
domestic producers have greater incentives for innovation (Mengistae, Daniels, Kaplan, Love, & 
Shah, 2010).  
Lastly, there are also greater calls for promotion of micro-enterprises to absorb much of the wage 
labour. The competition framework already encompasses the role that Competition Authorities 
play in promoting and sustaining small businesses in merger regulation, however only one case 
has come before the Tribunal which has specifically been related to small business and this case 
did not deal directly with merger regulation22. This matter was initially refused by the Commission 
and was taken up in a personal context by the owner of the business. However, the regulatory 
process was too long and the resources required too immense that the small business was driven 
out of the market.  
Competition policy needs to be more mindful of the role that large enterprises have in foreclosing 
small businesses from entering into a market. It also needs to be mindful that the regulatory and 
financial burden placed on small firms can be debilitating. Competition policy and the Competition 
Act need to be geared towards promoting the role that micro-enterprises have in absorbing most 
of the unemployment apparent in South Africa and as this paper has mentioned should 
concentrate on amending the Competition Act to include such provisions. 
                                                          













As an aside, there has been widespread debate to the amount of protection that labour is given in 
South Africa, both in a competition and a labour law context. With record levels of unemployment, 
which currently sit between 26.7 and 38.8 percent, labour regulation has a high place on the 
policy agenda of government. The level of perceptions of the rigidity and inflexibility of South 
African labour law can be attributed to the requirements for pre-dismissal procedural fairness by 
arbitrators and courts (Bhorat & Cheadle, 2009; Van Niekerk, 2004; Roskam, 2007). As a result 
procedural fairness is a matter where widespread reform needs to be enacted in order to address 
the high levels of rigidity that is apparent in the hiring and firing of employees. 
Concluding remarks 
In answering our question, we believe that public interest provisions definitely deserve a place in 
South African competition law. However, in going forward government needs to be cognisant of 
the Competition Act’s ability to promote competition policy. Extending the Competition Act to deal 
with public interest issues that are not explicitly outlined in the Competition Act, are outside the 
parameters of the Courts and place on them a burden to appease governmental policy objectives 
when in actual fact these policy objectives are not stipulated within the Competition Act.  
Secondly, South Africa’s contextual basis does provide for a need to include public provisions 
within the Competition Act regardless of such downfalls that may appear. As the Competition 
Authorities iron out the inconsistencies which appeared in the some cases and decrease the 
regulatory burden on businesses regarding mergers, both labour and business can work together 
towards a common goal of benefiting the economic landscape of South Africa.  
Benefiting the economic landscape of South Africa cannot, this paper has argued, be done by a 
single policy approach. Neither can government prescribe the will of its economic policy on the 
Competition Act. Rather, government needs to address public interest concerns through an 
integrated policy approach using trade policy, labour policy and promoting broader macro-
economic stability to aid in reducing the high levels of inequality and mass joblessness found in 
the economy.   
Lastly, the Competition Authorities have so far been successful in balancing the mandate of 
promoting competition as well as considering public interest concerns with only a few exceptions. 
The independence of the Competition Authorities to not be swayed by lobbying groups is a critical 
aspect of the Competition Authorities in relation to their credibility in maintaining this balance. 
Much like the Reserve Bank prosperity is dependent on independence, the Competition 












business. Proposed amendments should seek to retain the balance between public interest 
issues and promotion of competition. Only by retaining credibility in maintaining a balance can 
competition policies and agencies be used as significantly effective tool together with many other 
policy and instrumental tools that need to be applied when addressing the development 
challenges of South Africa. 
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